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Conventional wisdom in European studies has long held that social policy is not an 
area in which the European Union can make a large difference. Solidarity, it is said, can only 
develop in societies where clear boundaries exist between individuals. Such is not the case 
in the EU, where a citizen’s primary allegiance is to his own country. Redistribution being a 
zero-sum  game,  the  majority  method  of  decision-making  is  required,  which  may  only  be 
viable if the legitimacy of central institutions is clearly established. The legitimacy of the EU 
institutions,  however,  is  said  to  be  weak.  In  addition,  a  number  of  different  traditions  of 
welfare protection co-exist within the EU, as has been stressed by Gösta Esping-Andersen 
(1990).  Citizens  are  strongly  attached  to  their  national  brand  of  protection:  in  several 
countries,  this  is  even  regarded  as  a  key  element  of  national  identity.  The  history  of 
European  integration  has  done  little  to  belie  these  views.  Social  policy  has  experienced 
relatively modest progress, and the difficulties inherent in the adoption of European financial 
perspectives, undermined by the evils  of “juste retour” have shown that redistribution and 
unanimity are indeed at odds.  
 
  This  contribution  purports  to  examine  the  problem  from  a  uniquely  different 
perspective. It  does not start  by taking  an  ontological view of  Europe, in  which the  EU’s 
activities are determined by reference to what Europe is. Nor does it rest on any normative 
views. Instead, it presents  evidence  demonstrating that European citizens  are becoming 
increasingly aware of their standards of living and worried about their children’s future, and 
that these sentiments nurture a political protest that is a potential source of instability for the 
EU unless met by an adequate political response.  
My argument is structured in the following manner. Section 1 argues that citizens’ 
attitudes towards the EU are at least partially linked to the extent to which they feel that they 
derive benefits from EU membership. Section 2 demonstrates the existence of a clear link 
between  an  individual’s  social  position  and  his  feeling  of  (in)security.  Section  3  reviews 
recent evidence suggesting that Europe is increasingly perceived as a factor of insecurity. 
This may help to explain the clear correlation between socio-economic factors and the lack of 
enthusiasm, even outright hostility, to European integration that has been displayed in recent 
electoral  contests.  Hence  the  conclusion:  unless  these  feelings  of  insecurity  are  duly 
addressed, governments are likely to find themselves exposed to growing turmoil, which may 
increase  their  reluctance  to  integrate  further,  and  could  even  lead  to  the  challenging  of 
certain elements of the “acquis communautaire”.  
 
 
1.  WHY BOTHER ABOUT CITIZENS’ PREFERENCES? 
 
A  whole  series  of  literature  on  European  integration  tends  to  regard  national 
governments as the dominant actors in European decision-making. The citizens’ influence 
remains limited. While they are given the right to vote every five years for the election of the 
Members of European Parliament, they are not, in contrast to the situation on the domestic 
scene,  allowed  to  determine  the  political  orientation  of  the  European  executive  (i.e.  the 
European  Commission)  or  to  give  a  clear  political  mandate  to  the  EU  institutions.  This 
provides the most likely explanation for the subsequent decline in turnout during European 
elections.  It  is  therefore  logical  to  suggest  that  citizens’  preferences  only  have  a  remote 
control over EU decisions.  
 
In a multi-level political system such as the EU, however, the situation is somewhat more 
complex. The ability of national governments to deliver benefits that reinforce their appeal in 
the eyes of voters has become increasingly constrained by their membership in the Union. 
To take  but one  example, the famous ‘Maastricht criteria’ have considerably reduced the 
governments’ margin of manoeuvre, making it more difficult for them to use fiscal policies on Renaud Dehousse – Social Protection: Why the EU needs to deliver 
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the eve of elections. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, the EU’s actions may have more 
impact on the fate of a national government than on that of the European institutions. 
 
Moreover, citizens’ support for European integration is far from being merely a question 
of ideals, or even of identity concerns. The “permissive consensus” of the 1960s, described 
by  Lindberg  and  Scheingold  (1970)  as  a  weakly  structured  opinion  in  favor  of  European 
integration, has long since disappeared. In the post-Maastricht period, various studies have 
shown that the more a citizen perceives the European Union as a benefit, the more he or she 
will support it. In the wake of the French and Dutch rejection of the Draft Constitutional Treaty 
in  2005,  it  could  even  be  asserted  that  we  are  witnessing  a  shift,  at  least  in  these  two 
countries, from the ‘pro versus against European integration’ cleavage to one of opposing 
views  as  to  the  future  development  of  the  integration  process.  As  is  widely  known,  the 
alleged free-market bias of the EU has played a crucial role during the French referendum 
campaign of 2005 (Brouard, Grossman and Sauger 2005).  Each of these factors renders it 
necessary to examine the citizens’ perceptions of the benefits they receive as EU citizens, as 
well  as  their  expectations,  and  to  analyze  how  these  two  elements  shape  their  overall 
attitude towards European integration. 
 
 
2.  THE DEMAND FOR SECURITY 
 
In recent years there has been an increasing demand for security (Castel 2003). This 
evolution  is easily explained. In a  world subject to rapid and  radical changes, feelings  of 
insecurity  tend  to  grow  and  diversify.  Economic  and  social  insecurities  encompass  those 
uncertainties related to employment (unemployment, precariousness, new forms of work), to 
retirement  (threatened  by  demographic  evolution)  or  even  to  healthcare.  Insecurity  also 
appears to be linked to identity threats: recent changes in European societies are challenging 
elements that have structured social life for a number of generations. The transformations of 
the working classes, immigration, or the weakening of traditional integration structures such 
as schools, churches, political parties and unions, have all contributed to the creation of a 
universe in which identity landmarks are more difficult to find. 
 
This trend does not affect all segments of the populace equally. A recent study based on 
European Social Survey data analyzed the impact of an individual’s socio-economic situation 
on their attitude towards security in Western European countries (Cerami 2006). The study 
found that the two elements are directly linked: the higher the standard of living, the more 
satisfied individuals are of their situation, and the more likely it is that they will feel secure. 
Thus, for example, individuals with an extremely low income level (below 6000  ) are also 
less satisfied with their situation, and are less inclined to declare themselves ‘happy’, than 
are those in the high income category. Individuals with a lower income are three times more 
likely to declare themselves to be in poor health than those individuals with a higher income. 
 
More importantly for our analysis, an individual’s situation also has an impact on his or 
her relation to others. Table I, for instance, displays responses to the question: “In general, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful”. It clearly 
shows that people with a lower income have less inclination to trust others. Renaud Dehousse – Social Protection: Why the EU needs to deliver 
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Table 1 Trust and Income 
   
 Household 
income 
71,9%  22,3%  5,8%  100% 
10,6%  73,5%  15,9%  100% 
27,4%  58,1%  14,5%  100% 
21,3%  61,1%  17,6%  100% 
15,7%  61,0%  23,3%  100% 
15,6%  59,6%  24,7%  100% 
24,1%  59,4%  16,5%  100% 





+  60000  
Total 
Low   Medium   High  
Trust level           
 
Total 





They  also  meet  friends,  relatives  and  colleagues  much  less  than  their  more  affluent 
counterparts, which is bound to have a negative impact on their social capital. 
 
All of these factors also influence perceptions of democracy. Thus, to the question “How 
satisfied are you of the way democracy works in your country?” individuals in the low income 
category responded significantly more critically than the average. As can be seen in Table 2, 
the  percentage  of  people  who  display  a  low  level  of  satisfaction  is  twice  as  high  among 
respondents in extremely low income households as among high income earners.   
 
 
Table 2 Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
Household Income 
27,6%  55,2%  17,2%  100% 
19,4%  60,1%  20,5%  100% 
22,7%  58,6%  18,7%  100% 
18,5%  58,0%  23,6%  100% 
12,8%  59,3%  27,9%  100% 
14,0%  56,4%  29,6%  100% 






+ 60000   
Total 
Low  Medium  High 
Total 
Source: Cerami 2006, based on ESS, Round 2, 2005; Round 1, 2003 for Italy 
   
 
This analysis demonstrates the existence of a strong socio-economic divide in Europe. 
Of course, it is well-known that huge differences exist from one country to the other, which 
provides a solid justification for EU efforts to increase the level of socio-economic cohesion 
among its members. However, this should not obscure the social dimension of the problem: 
throughout  Europe,  people  in  lower  income  categories  tend  to  show  lower  levels  of 
satisfaction and face greater difficulties of social insertion.  
 
None  of  these  findings  are  particularly  surprising,  but  they  do  empirically  confirm  the 
existence of a significant level of discontent and of a feeling of insecurity in certain segments 
of  the  populace.    Studies  of  the  European  public  opinion  have  demonstrated  that  social Renaud Dehousse – Social Protection: Why the EU needs to deliver 
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factors also affect individuals’ political attitudes, particularly their attitude towards European 
integration. Support for the EU has a clear elitist bias: it tends to increase in proportion to an 
individual’s social status or to his or her level of education. Moreover, people in a lower social 
position generally view  European integration as  a threat to their level  of social  protection 
(Cautrès and Grunberg 2007). Could this also influence their electoral behaviour? It is to this 
question that I shall now turn, primarily analyzing evidence from the referenda on the draft 
constitutional treaty.  
 
 
3.  WHEN EUROPE BECOMES A SOURCE OF FEAR 
 
The  votes  organized  in  several  European  countries  during  2004-05  have  shown  that 
European integration, associated for a long time with the hope of a better future, had instead 
become a source of worries for a growing number of citizens. To be sure, the results of these 
votes were largely determined by domestic factors. Both in France and in the Netherlands, 
the governments had reached record levels of unpopularity at the time the vote took place. 
Yet  we  cannot  ignore  the  important  structural  elements  that  came  to  the  fore  on  those 
occasions.  
 
At the time of the French referendum, 52 % of those questioned and more than three 
quarters of the proponents  of the “no” vote  declared themselves  worried  by  or hostile to 
Europe. For the past ten years, the number of French citizens who were worried constantly 
exceeded  the  number  of  those  who  declared  themselves  to  be  confident
1.      Within  this 
context,  anxiety,  fuelled  by  the  xenophobic  discourse  of  radical  movements,  naturally 
increased. 
 
  Today, Europe is primarily perceived as a large market, where the ambitions in the 
field of security do not necessarily meet with the  public’s expectations. The creation of a 
European area appears as a threat as this area  tends to expand without any precise limits.  
The free movement of people benefits not only students but also immigrants.  Exposure to 
competition,  although certainly  a  source  of  increased  wealth  for  some,  can  also  lead  to 
corporate  closures.  Furthermore,  Europe  imposes  constraints  upon  national  governments 
that can reduce their ability to take action.  The elimination of border controls and the severe 
budgetary restrictions imposed by the stability pact limit states’ capabilities of ensuring their 
traditional function as security providers, and the EU has not quite succeeded  them in this 
respect. The dangers that can result from this gap are evident. The idea – whether justified 
or not – that the expectations of the populace in this regard are not adequately taken into 
account has clearly played a role in the “anti-system” votes that have been recorded over the 
past few years in a number of European countries.  
 
The European referenda have breathed new life into these sentiments. During the 
French and Dutch referendum campaigns, advocates of the “no” vote succeeding in playing 
on  the  fears  of  a  large  percentage  of  the  population.  In  France,  the  European  Union’s 
institutional reforms, which represented the principal rationale for the constitutional project, 
were completely obscured by the main theme of the campaign: the “liberal” (free market) 
nature  of  European  construction.  Liberalism  was  perceived  as  the  quintessential  threat.  
Rather than reflecting on an articulation between the market and social policy, the leaders of 
the “no” camp purposely sought to alienate these two notions from each other. This message 
was received. Dissatisfaction with the economic and social situation was one of the primary 
motivations for supporters of the “no” vote. Identity factors also seem to have played a key 
role. Coupled with the anxieties engendered by the economic situation was a sentiment of 
“social  demotion”  amongst  the  lower-educated  sector  of  the  population  (Perrineau  2005). 
Fear of the “Other”, whether he is a wage-earner from the eastern countries or a Turkish 
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immigrant, was a powerful lever in the campaign against the treaty. Its efficiency is beyond 
doubt:  67  %  of  voters  who  feel  that  there  are  too  many  foreigners  in  France  also  voted 
against the constitutional treaty, while opposition to the proposal for Turkey’s membership in 
the European Union constituted a deciding factor for 35 % of supporters of the “no” vote
2. In 
the Netherlands, the question of national sovereignty and the problems linked to immigration 
held a major position in the campaign (Cuperus 2005). 
 
Feelings of insecurity appear to have accentuated a social stratification of the vote 
that has been initially revealed in past studies of European public opinion. In France, the 
strong mobilization of the popular classes rendered the “no” vote a large majority amongst 
the  working  class  population,  with  79  %  of  blue-collar  workers  and  67  %  of  employees 
rejecting the constitutional treaty.  The “no” vote also became a majority amongst the middle 
classes, with a 19 point rise since the Maastricht treaty (53%).  The “no” vote was only in the 
minority amongst students (46%) and retirees (44%). A similar observation can also be made 
in relation to levels of income: the positive vote prevailed only in those households where 
monthly salaries exceeded 3000  
3.  
These trends should not be viewed as a  French specificity, however, for a similar 
divide could be discerned in all countries that held referenda on the draft constitutional treaty: 
in the Netherlands, the “no” prevailed in all categories, yet it reached 78 %, or 16 points 
above  average,  amongst  blue-collar  workers.  Even  in  the  richer  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxembourg, the negative vote received a clear majority (66%) in the same income category. 
There was thus a homogenous social profile of the negative vote in Europe: it prevailed the 
18-24  year  age  group,  amongst  blue-collar  workers  and  people  with a   lower  level  of 
education (Eurobaromètre 2005). 
 
These findings can be partly explained by short-term factors. Traditionally, support for 
integration is sensitive to the economic situation. It weakens when unemployment rises or 
during periods of slow economic growth (Cautrès 1998).  Anxiety begins to rise, which in 
some countries increases the temptation to turn inward. However, a deeper “social fracture” 
can also be discerned. On the one hand, we see small social groups of educated individuals 
open to multiculturalism, and for whom opening up to Europe and the world constitutes an 
opportunity to broaden their personal and professional horizons, and who look to the future 
with confidence. On the other hand, there are those who see their way of life threatened by 
economic  change,  a  rise  in  precariousness,  a  reduction  in  public  services,  and  who  are 
confronted  on  a  daily  basis  with  the  presence  of  an  imperfectly  integrated  immigrant 
population. They have lost all confidence in traditional political parties and are pessimistic 
about their future and that of their children
4. One of the keys to understanding the French 
vote, which constitutes a principal difference with the vote during the Maastricht Treaty, is the 
shift  in  attitude  of  an  important  segment  of  the  middle  classes.  Well  represented  in  the 
Socialist party, this section of citizens shifted from the first to the second category – that of 
fear – and thus of the “no” vote.  
 
Again, this should not be seen as a mere French problem. Indeed, one of the most 
interesting developments of the past few years is the emergence of more radical movements 
to the left of socialist  or social-democratic parties, who are strongly critical  of the  market 
economy and of European integration. Die Linke in Germany or the Socialistische Partij in 
the Netherlands are good examples of this new trend. Although their electoral fortunes have 
varied, they have caused considerable damage to their main contenders on the left.  
One might argue that such questions of electoral sociology are primarily a matter of 
domestic concern. However this is a short-sighted view. The political parties’ attitude towards 
                                                 
2 IPSOS, “Les motivations du vote selon la proximité syndicale”, p. 4. 
3 IPSOS, “Le Non des classes actives, des classes populaires et moyennes et du peuple de gauche”, May 30, 
2005 
4 The Radical Right parties largely benefited from this (Perrineau 2001). Renaud Dehousse – Social Protection: Why the EU needs to deliver 
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Europe  and  governmental  behaviour  on  the  European  scene  are  strongly  and  inevitably 
influenced by electoral concerns. If a party or government intends to gain or to retain power, 
they must heed the voters. In most European countries, support for integration has been 
made possible by large coalitions that cut across party cleavages. If parties were to fear that 
their supporters’ insecurity concerns may cause them to lose elections, their pro-European 
enthusiasm  would  most likely fade quickly. In the  Netherlands, for instance, the  electoral 
fragility of the parties in power over the last few years has caused a significant shift of the 
government’s attitude on the European scene: once a strenuous upholder of the “Community 
method”,  it  has  gradually  moved  towards  more  Euro-sceptic  positions.  This  is  unlikely  to 
remain an isolated episode if the above-mentioned problems are not addressed. 
 
 
4. THE EU ALSO NEEDS TO ADDRESS SECURITY ISSUES  
 
  It  is  clear  that  the  security  concerns  discussed  above  must  be  addressed.  Many 
governments  are  aware  of  this  and  have  made  security  an  important  element  of  their 
discourse.  This  is  notably  the  case  for  France  since  the  election  of  President  Sarkozy. 
However, action purely at the national level cannot possibly suffice. Competition, freedom of 
movement and security are all closely linked in an integrated market. Those who feel they 
are living in a more unstable environment than in the past do not accept that the EU will 
content itself to open up to the wider world. Should they believe that integration is somehow 
reducing their level of protection, they will force their governments to take radical measures 
without concern for the needs of Europe. 
 
  If  the  EU  intends  to  respond  to  the  fears  expressed  in  recent  years,  it  must  make 
security one of its main objectives. To do this, it must clearly state that it intends to provide a 
high level of protection in areas as diverse as the fight against social exclusion, immigration 
policy or public health.  
 
  Increased  protection  at  the  EU  level  does  not  necessarily  translate  into  the 
centralization  of  all  decision-making.  As  it  is  not  a  State,  the  EU  must  avoid  giving  the 
impression that it wishes to take the reins from the national governments in essential areas 
for lest it would become a scapegoat for all unpopular measures. Giving priority to security 
issues might imply that member states could in some cases be exempted from the general 
principles of free movement or competition in order to maintain a high level of protection. In 
itself, there is nothing revolutionary about this idea – there is more than one precedent in the 
Treaty of Rome
5 – but establishing this as a general principle is likely to reassure many who 
feel threatened by the way society is evolving. This would also force the European Court of 
Justice to pay closer heed to the necessity of preserving national systems of social protection 
than it has done in recent rulings
6. 
 
   Due to the breadth of the task, the EU will need to take action on many different levels. 
It is important to make a distinction between policies dominated by the desire for efficiency 
and policies that aim to ensure a better distribution of wealth
7. In the former case, the EU 
may  often  find  itself  restricted  to  establishing  regulations  and  structures  that  govern 
cooperation between states at the European level. Although the EU has intervened many 
times in areas such  as  health,  maritime or food safety since  Maastricht and  Amsterdam, 
recent problems, such as bird flu or air transport, have served as a reminder that the member 
                                                 
5 See for example article 30 (formerly 36) that lists a whole series of possible exemptions to the free movement of 
goods, on condition that these restrictions do not constitute “a means of arbitrary discrimination, or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States”. 
6 In particular in cases C-438/05  (Viking Line APB) and C-341/05 (Laval un Partneri Ltd), seen by many as 
threatening national systems of industrial relations. 
7  On  the  distinction  between  ‘social  regulation’  policies,  dominated  by  considerations  of  efficiency,  and 
redistributive social policies, see (Majone 1996). Renaud Dehousse – Social Protection: Why the EU needs to deliver 
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states do not always respond consistently and efficiently when faced with a crisis.  In some 
cases, EU regulatory interventions will be required, as this will be the only way to reconcile 
occasionally contradictory requirements for protection and freedom of movement. 
 
  The situation is far more complex as far as social insecurity is concerned, since it is 
difficult to reach unanimous agreement on the level of protection required. A lack of unity 
amongst the citizens of Europe as well as scarce financial resources renders illusory any 
wide-ranging program of solidarity on the European scale. The heterogeneity of the various 
social  models  dampens  any  desire  for  harmonization.  However,  Europe  can  no  longer 
restrict itself to merely being a catalyst for modernization. 
 
  Currently,  the European Union is asked to steer the economic modernization process, 
even  if  member  states  do  not  always  honor  their  commitments,  as  the  relative  lack  of 
success  of  the  Lisbon  strategy  has  proven.  In  turn,  they  continue  to  retain  control  over 
policies of social solidarity, which are essential to national cohesion. The evidence discussed 
in this  paper seems to indicate that the political foundations  underpinning this division  of 
labour have narrowed.  
 
  Modernization  is  not  a  neutral  process;  it  produces  winners  and  losers.  It  is  not 
sufficient to maintain that the collective well-being of Europeans will eventually improve in the 
long  term. Some  interest  in  the  immediate  situation  of  those  who  have  paid  the  price  of 
modernization must also be shown. If this is not done, there will be no hope for a broad 
consensus  on  European  integration.  Alternatively,  a  complete  nationalization  of  social 
policies and their protection against any unwanted interference at the European level, as has 
occasionally  been  suggested  in  some  countries,  would  encourage  the  development  of 
protectionist  strategies  detrimental  to  the  continent’s  economic  well-being  (Jouen  and 
Palpant 2005). 
 
  It is therefore necessary to define a middle path, demonstrating that Europe does not 
intend to undermine national social welfare systems and that, at the same time, it has its own 
social ambitions. Justice must be done, and be seen to be done. This is not the place to 
discuss the type of mechanism by which this could be achieved. However, it seems clear that 
financial solidarity will need to be strengthened. An ambitious goal? Decidedly! And yet there 
is reason to believe that the need to address this issue will no longer be ignored, without 
paying  a  heavy  political  price.  Public  expectations  appear  to  be  similar  amongst  all  the 
European Union member states, old and new alike. If Europe fails to deliver, it is likely that it 
will face growing opposition in a large number of countries.  
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